

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 COPENH 03331 01 OF 02 122244Z

64

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAJ-01 ACDA-10 OMB-01 TRSE-00 /066 W

----- 111415

O 122150Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1777

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 3331

REF: COPENHAGEN 3328

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAG: PFOR, DA, NATO

SUBJECT: MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER K.B. ANDERSEN IN  
BERLINGSKE TIDENDE

1. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

"IS IT NAIVE TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DETENT?"

IT IS HARDLY REMARKABLE THAT MANY PEOPLE ASK THE QUESTION: WHAT  
IS ACTUALLY THE REASON BEHIND THE FACT THAT DENMARK IS PLAYING  
SUCH AN ACTIVE PART IN THE POLICY OF DETENTE BETWEEN EAST AND  
WEST? DOES THIS WHOLE DETENTE POLICY NOT REST ON AN ILLUSION?

IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE THE BACKGROUND FOR SUCH QUESTIONS.  
TIME AFTER TIME IN RECENT YEARS AND EVEN UP TO THE PRESENT TIME,  
WE HAVE HEARD ONE STATEMENT AFTER ANOTHER CONCERNING INCREASED  
ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER  
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL FORCE  
REDUCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN UNDERWAY FOR NARLY TWO  
YEARS, APPARENTLY WITHOUT HAVING PRODUCED ANY RESULTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 COPENH 03331 01 OF 02 122244Z

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE

AMONG THE 35 COUNTRIES WHICH THIS SUMMER IN HELSINKI SIGNED  
THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.  
THIS DOCUMENT  
CONTAINS IMPORTANT PROVISIONS ON FREER CONTACTS ACROSS BORDERS,  
BUT IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT TO DATE - DESPITE THE  
BEST OF INTENTIONS - THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT INDICATES  
THAT THE EASTERN SIDE INTENDS TO LIVE UP TO THE WORDS  
OF THE DOCUMENT. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT WE ANSWER  
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE DANISH POLICY OF  
DETENTE IS NOT NAIVE.

IF AN ATTEMPT IS TO BE MADE TO ANSWER A QUESTION CONCERNING THE  
CHARACTER OF DETENTE POLICY, IT MUST BE SAID AT THE  
VERY START THAT THE ANSWER IS MADE MORE DIFFICULT  
BY THE FACT THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE DICTATORSHIPS.  
THIS MEANS THAT THEY ARE COUNTRIES WITHOUT FREE TELEVISION, RADIO  
OR PRESS, WITHOUT A LEGAL OPPOSITION, WITHOUT ANY REAL  
POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC CONTROL OF, NOT TO SPEAK  
OF CRITICISM OF, THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.  
THIS MEANS THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ANALYZE THE  
POLICY OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES.

NEVERTHELESS, AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO POINT OUT THE  
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, WHICH CAN FORM THE ANSWER TO THE  
QUESTION AS TO WHAT  
IS REALISTIC IN DETENTE POLICY.  
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE  
OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES - ALTHOUGH IN VARYING DEGREES -  
THERE IS A REAL NEED TO HAVE FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM  
ENORMOUS ARMAMENTS BURDENS TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES.  
THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING DAILY LIVING  
CONDITIONS OF THE ORDINARY POPULATION MORE QUICKLY IS,  
CONSEQUENTLY, ONE OF THE FACTORS WHICH CAN INSPIRE  
CONFIDENCE IN THE SINCERITY BEHIND THE EASTERN DESIRE  
TO ACHIEVE DETENTE, FORCE REDUCTIONS AND LOWER  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES, INSTEAD OF MAINTAINING THE  
COSTLY ARMAMENTS OF RECENT YEARS.

TO THIS MUST BE ADDED THE SOBER OBSERVATION THAT THE NEXT  
MAJOR WAR WILL DISTINGUISH ITSELF FROM ALL FORMER WARS BY THE FACT  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 COPENH 03331 01 OF 02 122244Z

THAT  
IT WILL LEAVE NO VICTOR, BUT A DESTROYED WORLD. AND  
LAST BUT NOT LEAST IS THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DIALOGUE  
WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAS TAKEN PLACE AND INCREASINGLY TAKES PLACE  
BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, THE USA AND THE USSR.

IN CONNECTION WITH DELIBERATIONS ON ARMAMENTS IN EASTERN  
COUNTRIES, IT SHOULD OF

COURSE NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES,  
AS WELL AS ALL OTHER COUNTRIES, HAVE THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY  
CONSIDERATIONS. KEEPING IN MIND THE ENORMOUS SUFFERING TO  
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS EXPOSED DURING THE ADVANCE OF THE  
NAZI TROOPS IN WORLD WAR II, ONE UNDERSTANDS HOW  
IMPORTANT IT IS FOR THE  
SOVIET UNION TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST FUTURE INVASIONS OF  
SIMILAR CHARACTER.

NEVERTHELESS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET  
UNION DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE A GREATER INTEREST IN ACHIEVING  
RESULTS IN THE FORCE REDUCTION DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA.

REGARDING THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
ONE MAY ASK: WHY WAS THE SOVIET UNION SO EAGER TO HAVE THIS  
CONFERENCE STARTED AND TO GET RESULTS FROM IT THIS  
SUMMER? IT IS RATHER OBVIOUS THAT THE INTEREST OF THE  
SOVIET UNION CHANGED CHARACTER DURING THE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE  
THE  
SOVIET UNION ORIGINALLY SAW IT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE  
ACTUAL PEACE AGREEMENT AFTER WORLD  
WAR II, WHICH STILL HAS NOT COME, AND  
AS A MEANS OF PAVING THE WAY FOR BETTER COOPERATION WITH  
WESTERN COUNTRIES IN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL  
FIELDS, THE SITUATION CHANGED RATHER FUNDAMENTALLY IN THE  
YEARS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS IN 1972 TO THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE IN 1975.  
IN THE FIRST PLACE, TALKS BEGAN IN SO MANY WAYS BETWEEN  
EAST AND WEST ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION - AMONG  
OTHER THINGS BECAUSE SUCH COOPERATION WAS ALSO IN GREAT  
MEASURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES - THAT IT WAS  
UNNECESSARY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS  
TO REACH RESULTS  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 COPENH 03331 01 OF 02 122244Z

WITHIN THESE FIELDS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 COPENH 03331 02 OF 02 130149Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAJ-01 ACDA-10 OMB-01 TRSE-00 /066 W

----- 113466

O 122150Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1778

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 COPENHAGEN 3331

IN THE SECOND PLACE, IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
SUCCEEDED IN HAVING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOABILITY OF THE  
BORDERS CONFIRMED, BUT IT HAD TO ACCEPT THE PROVISION ON  
THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL BORDER REVISIONS.

IN THE THIRD PLACE, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS A SURPRISE FOR  
THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SUCCEEDED IN  
IMPLEMENTING A NUMBER OF RATHER CONCRET PROVISIONS ON FREER  
CONTACTS ACROSS THE BORDERS, IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AS  
WELL AS PEOPLE. THUS, THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT CANNOT IN ITSELF  
BE TAKEN AS AN EXPRESSION OF A SPECIAL DETENTE EFFORT ON THE PART  
OF THE EASTERN SIDE. ONLY THE READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AND THE OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES TO TRANSLATE THE HELSINKI  
DOCUMENT INTO EVERYDAY PRACTICAL REALITY IN COMING YEARS, CAN  
DEMONSTRATE THE DEGREE ZEAL IN ACHIEVING  
DETENTE.

WHAT THEN IS DENMARK'S POSITION ON DETENTE POLICY, AS SEEN AGAINST  
THE OUTLINED BACKGROUND?

WHEN IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE FOR DENMARK TO PLAY A VERY ACTIVE ROLE  
IN THE DETENTE POLICY OF RECENT YEARS, - APART FROM THE  
NATURAL DESIRE TO PURSUE SUCH A POLICY, IT IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE  
DENMARK IS A MEMBER OF NATO AND THE EC. SECURITY  
POLICY HAS BEEN A DECISIVE PREREQUISITE FOR THE DIALOGUE  
WHICH HAS BEEN STARTED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WITHOUT THE  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 COPENH 03331 02 OF 02 130149Z

STRENGTH AND SECURITY WHICH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS MEANT  
AND MEANS FOR  
THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HELSINKI  
DOCUMENT, OR CONCERNING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN VIENNA, WOULD  
HARDLY HAVE GOTTEN STARTED.

BEYOND THIS THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE  
NATO COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE THE BENEFITS WHICH A LONG PEACEFUL

DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II HAS MEANT. ALSO THE NEUTRAL STATES-  
AS -FREE-LOADERS - HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY THROUGH  
THE WESTERN DEFENSE COOPERATION. THE VERY CREDIBILITY WHICH  
ONLY THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE GIVES TO THE  
EUROPEAN DEFENSE MAKES ALL TALK OF A DEFENSE RELATED TO THE  
EC MEANINGLESS.

FOR DENMARK A POLICY OF DETENTE, THEREFORE, CANNOT MEAN A  
WEAKENING OF DEFENSES. THE LONG TERM AIM MUST NATURALLY BE TO  
CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE NATO AS WELL AS  
THE WARSAW PACT SUPERFLUOUS. BUT AFTER ALL THIS IS NOT  
RIGHT AROUND THE CORNER.

AND ONE THING IS OBVIOUS: SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IS NOT PROMOTED  
THROUGH ONE SIDED WEAKENING OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

ACTIVE DANISH PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE IS ALSO PART OF A REALISTIC FOREIGN  
POLICY. IF EFFORTS TO CREATE A BETTER EAST-WEST CLIMATE ARE  
TO SUCCEED, IT MUST BE IMPORTANT TO  
CONTRIBUTE TO ALL REALISTIC STEPS WHICH CAN SERVE TO BREAK DOWN  
ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS THROUGH EUROPE.

DENMARK PROPOSED AT THE LAST NORADIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING  
THAT A FOLLOW-UP OF THE SECURITY-AND COOPERATION CONFERENCE  
BE A PERMANENT POINT ON THE AGENDA OF COMING NORADIC MEETINGS.  
WE WILL WORK ON THIS FOLLOW-UP UNDER EC AUSPICES. AND INsofar AS THE  
DANISH PROPOSAL IS CONCERNED. THE USA HAS RECOMMENDED TO NATO'S  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE THAT IT DEAL WITH THE PARTS OF THE HELSINKI  
DOCUMENT WHICH FALL NATURALLY WITHIN NATO'S FIELD OF ACTIVITY.  
IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WE ARE PREPARING TO  
ORGANIZE A SPECIAL WORKING GROUP, WHICH HAS THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE  
HELSINKI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 COPENH 03331 02 OF 02 130149Z

PROTOCOL AS ITS ONLY FUNCTION.

HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE HELSINKI  
DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE USED FOR PERPETUAL NEEDLEPRICKS IN RELATION  
TO THE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD DESTROY THE POSSIBILITY THAT  
THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT CAN REALLY BECOME AN INSTRUMENT IN THE  
SERVICE OF PEACE AND DETENTE. OBVIOUSLY, EASTERN COUNTRIES  
AS WELL AS WESTERN ONES ARE OBLIGATED BY THEIR SIGNATURES,  
BUT THE DOCUMENT IS TOO IMPORTANT AS A LINK IN POSTWAR POLICY  
TO BE USED FOR EVERYDAY POLEMICS.

ALSO DENMARK'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSION  
AMONG THE NINE EC GOVERNMENTS IS IMPORTANT AS SEEN FROM A DETENTE  
POLICY VIEWPOINT.

IT IS NOT WRONG TO STATE THAT THE EC COUNTRIES THROUGH THIS VERY CONTRIBUTION HAVE CONTRIBUTED DECISEVLY TO THE SUCCESSFUL COURSE OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE. FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION AMONG EC COUNTRIES MUST ALSO BE THE NATURAL FORUM IN WHICH TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS,; MEANING HOW THE FORCE REDUCTIONS - IF THEY SHOULD MATERIALIZE ONE DAY-INFLUENCE DETENTE AND DISARMAMENTSIN EUROPE.

APART FROM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION EFFECTS, IT MUST ALSO BE NATURAL FOR DANISH FOREIGN POLICY TO CONTINUE THE BILATERAL DIALGOUE WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH WAS STARTED BY THE DANES, PROBABLY AS THE FIRST OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, IN THE MIDDLE 60'S. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ACCEPT DICTATORSHIP AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT. BUT WE TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE THE SAME FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS WE DO, WILL NOT EXCEED ABOUT 25. WE CANNOT LIMIT OUR INTERNATIONALCONTACTS TO THESE COUNTRIES. WHEN WE REACTED STRONGLY TOWARDS THE GREEK JUNTA GOVERNMENT, THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL AND NOW RECENTLY IN CONNECTION WITH EVENTS IN SPAIN, IT MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND THAT THESE COUNTRIES BELONG IN THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS, AND THAT THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE OPPOSED AND STILL OPPOSE REGARDING SPAIN ARE AN OBSTACLE TO ECONOMIC AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE.  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 COPENH 03331 02 OF 02 130149Z

THEREFORE, THERE IS GOOD SENSE IN THE SECURITY POLICY WE PURSUE, AS IT CONTRIBUTES TO AN OPEN DIALOGUE ON DETENTE.

THERE IS GOOD SENSE IN ATTEMPTING TO BREAK DOWN ARITIFICAL BARRIERS THROUGH THE HELSINKI DOCUMEMNT - WITHOUT ANY ILLUSIONS OF CHANGING THE WORLD FROM ONE WEEK TO THE NEXT.

THERE IS GOOD SENSE IN STRENGTHENING OUR OWN FOREIGN POLICY POSSIBILITIES, ALSO WITH A VIEW TO DETENTE, THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION IN THE EC.

AND THERE IS GOOD SENSE IN MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN THE EAST.

AND FINALLY, AS THE QUITE DECISIVE ARGUMENT FOR EFFORTS TOWARDS DETENTE, THERE IS OF COURSE THE FACT THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO A POLICY OF DETENTE,IS ADDITIONAL ARMAMENTS WITH WAR AS THE FINAL OUTCOME. THEREFORE, WE ARE NOT NAIVE WHEN WE PARTICIPATE IN A POLICY OF DETENTE.

BUT THERE MIGHT PERHAPS BE REASON TO TELL OUR NEGOTIATING  
PARTNERS IN THE EAST THAT IF THEY EXPECT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS  
ON DETENTE TO BE ABLE TO CREATE A ONESIDED WEAKENING OF  
WESTERN SECURITY WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THIS POLICY OF DETENTE, THEN  
THEY ARE WRONG.  
DEAN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TEXT, SPEECHES, DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 NOV 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975COPENH03331  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750394-0573  
**From:** COPENHAGEN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751151/aaaabtpt.tel  
**Line Count:** 337  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 COPENHAGEN 3328  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ElyME  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 AUG 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 AUG 2003 by chicheje>; APPROVED <27 FEB 2004 by ElyME>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, OVIP, US, DA, NATO, (ANDERSEN, KNUD BORGE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006